A bit of background...my grandparents lived in Jackson County...so we would drive by Chillicothe and saw the Parkersburg Subdivision operations regularly. I was introduced to railroading on this line and the Portsmouth Branch that left the main line at Hamden. I had, for years, heard stories as to the why...but finally, through connections, I was able to interview Chessie Vice President William (Bill) Howes, Jr. who was present at the decision making meeting.
Here is our dialogue, re-written into a narrative format, which I hope makes sense:
"It was the end of the fiscal year, 1985, John Snow, who was then President of the Chessie System and John Collinson, Chairman of the Board for Chessie, called all of the VP's together to discuss where the company was financially. Well, the numbers weren't very pretty and the operations department was in the red. Ron Drucker, the VP of Operations, quickly surmised that the Parkersburg "branch" (as it was called) would be a logical way to make up the difference. Drucker had obviously put some time into this as he then began to spew data, numbers, run times, etc...,he came prepared to make a solid argument for this line's demise. Drucker’s plan was to divert the traffic, lay off most train crews, Maintenance of Way, Signal Department and all terminal and clerical staffs. Gradually the line would die, and they could rip it out. This not only made up the operation budget deficit, but Drucker pointed immediately to the fact that they could continue to make a better profit by avoiding the operations nightmare that was the Parkersburg Sub (more on that in a bit).
In my (Eric's) research, my first question was, why was this line always referred to as a "branch"? By this time, summer 1985, traffic was down to four through trains or so per day via Parkersburg and Chillicothe, (two of course being pig trains), most freight traffic, even at this time, was routed via Pittsburgh and across Ohio. The concept of a “main line” seemed to be reserved for describing a route for the primary traffic line that ran up and over Sand Patch. Plus, if one traces back the history of this line, it was indeed just a branch line operation and engineered as such in it's building, it was only after the line was strung together with the Marietta and Cincinnati (B&O Ohio Division) and the Ohio and Mississippi (B&O St. Louis Division), when this line became viable as a major route.
Back to the “meeting”, at this point, when Drucker announced his plan, the new Marketing VP, Jim Hagan, nearly lost his cookies. He had been with Chessie just a little over a year and was still getting used to the culture. They (the marketing folks) were not prepared for this plan and had nothing in terms of data to defend keeping the line. Snow looked at Hagan for the facts, to which he could provide none in lieu of no data, other then the obvious fact that this move would destroy the St. Louis piggyback traffic (which it did).
It's interesting to note that Chessie System was really not that big into intermodal, period. Chessie's bread and butter was coal and manifest and in particular, auto parts. In fact some at Chessie felt TOFC was less important then general merchandise traffic. It is only after CSX evolved, it was the folks on the Seaboard side that was really driving the intermodal needs. We also had the change in global economy that proved that TOFC/COFC was a viable option. In fact, it was auto parts traffic that was the primary reason this part of the former B&O (from Clarksburg west to Chillicothe) was given some TLC in 1963 (after the C&O merger). Clearances were raised accommodate high cubes and some auto racks but not necessarily for TOFC traffic. The tunnels were raised to 17' 2", but not the needed 20' 8" for stacks (again, TOFC was the rage until stacks became more of a rage), this also worked for high cube and most auto racks of the day. However, the tunnel enlargements were about it. Some curves were eased, but these were the real operations issue (not the grades). In fact, Chessie even had many problems with grain trains in high cube hopper cars because of harmonic issues with jointed rail, these concerns led to numerous slow orders and caveats in operations (i.e. if a train can not exceed 24 mph then speed must reduced back to 15 between MP XX to MP XX). My research shows that there were several 6 degree curves and one 7 degree curves between Clarksburg and Parkersburg. The Ohio side was a bit better except for the 8 degree curve on the Ohio University campus in Athens. But, what is an interesting twist of irony, it was during the 1963's upgrade when people saw that the traffic could be rerouted over longer routes and still have respectable transit times, perhaps the seed was planted early?
Back to the "big table meeting", you have the realists in the operating department in the facts, and the prognosticators in marketing saying that it's our best guess that we'll get clobbered in the St. Louis market. Snow, being the accountant, went with the numbers. No one seemed to cared that TOFC would get slaughtered, they wanted a clear bottom line. This was the beginning of the end. With Marketing not given a chance to defend and operations with the numbers, it was going to be a tough line to save. Indeed, the TOFC traffic did get slaughtered, and the route up and over Ohio added, at times, days to a cars schedule. It was a disaster in the making but no one appeared to be concerned.
After the line closure, the TOFC traffic, which was the pride of the line, (with names such as the St Louis Trailer Jet and the Manhattan Trailer Jet), dried up when rerouted up and over Ohio. This routes closure, to some, ended St. Louis as a viable gateway for intermodal traffic to and from the east coast ports. The irony of all of this is only after CSX spent it's money on Conrail are we seeing this begin to change. Plus, as the 1980's moved into the 90's CSX was trying to consolidate gateways to the west. At the early part of the 1990's, CSX had four gateways: Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis and New Orleans. Chicago was an obvious choice, the other was New Orleans. So again, St. Louis was allowed to fizzle out. Add to all of this the changes in global market, the slow down of domestic auto sales in the 1980's and the conditions were ripe for abandonment. Rail banking had not become as "vogue" as it is today.
So while it is perceived that the line was axed quickly, the operations numbers tell a tale that the line had declined for years (even perhaps as early as the 1960's when the original reroutes took place for the improvements). I am not letting CSX (actually Chessie System) off the hook for it's abandonment, but the numbers were not in the lines favor. There was little local traffic really any place between Chillicothe and Parkersburg (the exception of the Portsmouth Branch at Hamden, which slowly lost traffic to trucks because Chessie started retreating on service at this location), the tough operating conditions east of Parkersburg and the downturn of the economy all lead toward the result we see. It's also worth noting that the 1985 elimination of through traffic on the St. Louis main line in West Virginia was accompanied by the elimination of through traffic via Benwood Junction, south of Wheeling. Three of the four B&O routes that had once served Benwood/Wheeling were later abandoned. The Benwood Junction engine terminal, which had once been among the busiest on the B&O, was shut down when the through traffic was rerouted. During the next ten years, its structures were gradually demolished until only the coaling tower was left standing in an otherwise vacant field. It was demolished in February 1996.
Perhaps what is most troubling to people is how rapidly the line closure unfolded. The August 2nd, 1985 Jackson (Ohio) Journal Herald carried the head line: “B&O Stops Through Train Service through the Area”, the article goes on to say that local service was to continue, but all through traffic had ended the day before (Aug 1st 1985). Union representatives had been contacted the same day as one of the last through trains wheels cooled in Chillicothe yards. The Union was blindsided by all accounts. One person was told as he went to check his call status, “We stopped running trains over your line yesterday.” More then anything, it seems the railroads quick action toward the employees is what’s troubling most.
In retrospect, many CSX operations people I’ve interviewed do lament about this lines removal. One operations person, who was a regional manager at the time, went so far as saying that they were hasty and that they didn’t think it through, and that it was a mistake they proceeded in the way they did. Was it a mistake? Perhaps it was...it's hard to tell. With the ongoing change in the eastern rail scene it is likely the line could have survived, at least for a while. CSX gained a far better route to St. Louis when buying Conrail, but as we know the cost was staggering."
I hope this helps put some things into context. I have about 40 pages of notes, emails, etc from operations people...I take their word more so then urban legends.
Eric at CG Tower
